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Abstract
Citizenship acquisition is often seen as a crucial step in the process of integrating immigrants
in host societies. This paper analyzes the question why some immigrants are more likely to
have acquired destination country citizenship across European states than others and tests
legal-formal, socioeconomic, cultural and micro-level explanations. We use a pooled dataset
of first and second generation immigrants resident in 15 European states and apply a logistic
multilevel analysis to measure country of origin effects, destination country effects, as well as
the effects of individual level characteristics. Our analysis shows that second generation and
first generation immigrants who arrived more than 20 years ago, immigrants with one parent
born in the destination country, retired workers and persons speaking the host country
language at home, are more likely to become a citizen of their country of residence. Second
generation Muslim immigrants are less likely to have host country citizenship than
comparable non-Muslim immigrants of the second generation. Immigrants from former
colonies  or  from  poor  or  political  instable  countries  are  more  likely  to  become  a  citizen  of
their  country  of  residence.  Immigrants  are  also  more  likely  to  have  acquired  citizenship  in
destination countries with a low net migration rate and with citizenship laws that make
citizenship accessible in comparative perspective.
2INTRODUCTION
Citizenship acquisition is often seen as a crucial step in the process of integrating immigrants
in host societies. Whereas increasingly more precise comparative information is available
about the differences in citizenship policies across European states, we know relatively little
about the systematic effects of these differences. Do more inclusive citizenship policies
indeed lead to higher rates of citizenship acquisition among immigrant groups?
This paper investigates the citizenship status of immigrants and analyzes the question why
some immigrants are more likely to have citizenship of their country of residence than others.
Twenty-five years ago observers still noted that ‘the social science literature on the
naturalization process is weak and few statistically valid generalizations can be made about
the effect of specific cultural, economic, political or familial variables on naturalization’
(DeSipio 1987, p. 402). Today, when reviewing the existing literature on the naturalization of
immigrants, it quickly becomes evident that the literature has progressed significantly, but
mostly within the context of North America.
In this paper we focus on the European context and use a pooled dataset on first and second
generation immigrants resident in 15 European countries. We test a series of hypotheses
derived from the social science literature on immigrant naturalization. Whereas many of these
hypotheses have been previously tested in quantitative studies, most –if not all–  of these
studies have focused on the US and sometimes Canadian context (see e.g. North 1987, Yang
1994, Jones-Correa 2001, Mazzolari 2007, and Chiswick and Miller 2008 on the US; Mata
1999, and DeVoretz and Pivnenko 2004 on Canada; Bloemraad 2002 on Canada and the US).
European studies are also mostly single case studies and often focused more on the effects of
naturalization (see e.g. Bevelander and Veenman 2006 on both the causes and the
socioeconomic consequences of naturalization in the Netherlands; Steinhardt 2008 on the
economic impact of naturalization in Germany). Other studies have described the available
national statistics on citizenship acquisition (see e.g. Clark et al 2006; Waldrauch 2006). We
know of no comparative analysis explaining immigrant naturalization across European
countries. Our study is thus important in terms of exploring a phenomenon that has been
understudied in the European context –where immigrant naturalization arguably has a
different dynamic than in classic settler states such as Australia, Canada and the US.
Moreover, by applying a logistic multilevel analysis to measure country of origin effects,
destination country effects, as well as the effects of individual level characteristics, we use a
comparative research design that is better suited to analyzing the importance of macro-level
factors related to the countries of residence. These factors can simply not be tested in single
country studies.
A brief word on terminology. We use the term ‘destination country’  in order to indicate the
country of residence of first and second generation immigration and the ‘origin country’  to
refer to either the country of birth (of the first generation) or the country of birth of their
parents (of the second generation). ‘Destination’  refers here to the direction of the migration
process. We are well aware that, in particular, when referring to second generation
‘immigrants’  these terms are misleading in the sense that these persons where born in the
country  of  their  residence  and  that  neither  ‘destination’  nor  ‘origin’  country  can  strictly
speaking be used, simply because these persons are not immigrants at all. In this paper we are
interested in capturing the dynamics of legal integration of both the first generation and their
immediate offspring.
3THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Virtually all empirical research on the question of what explains immigrant naturalization
applies what DeVoretz (2008: 682) terms an ‘ad hoc approach’: a collection of a wide-ranging
number of explanations, formulated at both individual and country level, in the absence of a
formal model that motivates immigration citizenship acquisition. DeVoretz (2008: 692) is
right to note that such an approach carries the danger of providing a ‘weak rationale and
ambiguous arguments on the direction of the effects of the […] variables’. Yet, as said in the
introduction, most of these variables have been developed and tested in a North American
context and their application to a European context is a novelty. We present here a first large-
scale comparative and explanatory analysis of immigrant citizenship acquisition in the
European context. Therefore, rather than testing a possibly more cohesive, but restricted
model, we favor an eclectic model in order to take on board as many as possible of the
variables that have been tested in the relevant literature.
We now discuss  the  existing  literature  and  the  hypotheses  that  we  will  test  in  the  empirical
part of the paper, categorizing them into three groups: macro-level explanations that focus on
the destination country and on the origin country and micro-level explanations that focus on
the individual characteristics of the immigrants. Within these three groups of explanations we
focus on legal-formal, socioeconomic, cultural and resource perspectives (cf. Bloemraad,
2002  for  a  related,  but  somewhat  different  typology  of  explanations).  For  each  of  the
hypotheses we indicate between brackets at which level they are formulated: destination
country, origin country or individual.
Legal-formal perspective: institutional conditions
The first group of explanations can be summarized under the heading ‘national citizenship
laws matter’. Citizenship laws vary greatly between countries and thus may well explain
differences in terms of naturalization rates between similar immigrant groups. Typically we
see important differences between ‘immigration countries’  such as Canada and the US, where
both birth at the territory still gives automatic access to citizenship to the second generation
and naturalization is seen as a natural part of the integration process that follows immigration,
and most European countries where citizenship acquisition has for a long time been
dominated by descent-based transmission from one generation to the other and therefore was
never very accessible to immigrants,  in comparison to countries such as Canada and the US
(see e.g. Brubaker, 1992; Bauböck et al, 2006; Howard 2009; Janoski 2010; Vink and De
Groot 2010).
Aspects of citizenship laws that influence the ‘accessibility’  of citizenship are ius soli
birthright, residence requirements, dual citizenship toleration, language and integration
requirements, fees, and administrative discretion. One might hypothesize, as many politicians
in  destination  countries  do,  who  either  aim  to  facilitate  or  restrict  access  to  citizenship  for
immigrants, that citizenship laws have an important influence on the citizenship acquisition
by immigrants (H1). For second generation immigrants, what matters in particular would be
the presence of regulations that imply the automatic or facilitated access to citizenship for
second generation immigrants (H2).
H1: Immigrants are more likely to have destination country citizenship in countries with a
citizenship law that makes citizenship relatively easily accessible. (destination country)
4H2: Second generation immigrants are more likely to have destination country citizenship
in countries where birth in a country provides automatic or highly facilitated access to
citizenship (‘ius soli effect’). (individual*destination country)
An important caveat to these hypotheses is that, in the European context for example, it is a
well-known phenomenon that even in those countries, such Austria, where the material
conditions for access to citizenship are high, naturalization rates may also be comparatively
high. This phenomenon may be driven by strong demand for destination country citizenship,
or specific demographic background of the target population, but also by the fact that even if
conditions are high, accessible procedures may facilitate access in general. North American
scholars have previously also underlined the importance of administrative procedures (North,
1987) as well as institutional environments (Bloemraad, 2002). Particularly Bloemraad’s
(2002) convincing comparative analysis of the Canadian and US context, where citizenship
laws are broadly similar but naturalization rates differ sharply between similar groups of
immigrants,  makes  us  careful  not  to  raise  too  high  expectations  about  the  effects  of
differences between citizenship laws. Having said this, that is no reason not to measure the
effect of legal differences, but rather to make sure that alternative explanations are included in
the model. Given that the in-depth research into broader institutional environments a la
Bloemraad goes beyond the scope of our empirical analysis we do not include a separate
hypothesis that captures these important dynamics.
Moving from destination country to sending country, scholars have noted that also the
citizenship laws in countries of origin matters, in particularly with regard to the toleration of
dual citizenship (Jones-Correa, 2001; Chiswick and Miller, 2008). Whereas in some countries
the voluntary acquisition of another citizenship leads either to the automatic loss or may cause
the withdrawal of citizenship of origin, in others such provisions on loss of citizenship do not
exist, or are restricted to naturalized citizens only. In order to maintain links with their
emigrant  community,  also  with  a  view  to  income  from  remittances,  many  countries,
particularly in Latin America, have abolished such loss provisions. We expect dual citizenship
toleration in sending countries to have a positive effect on immigrant citizenship acquisition
in destination countries (H3).
H3: Immigrants from countries that accept dual citizenship are more likely to have
destination country citizenship than immigrants from those countries that do not accept
dual citizenship. (origin country)
Moving to the individual level, given that the institutional context in migration receiving
countries generally favors long-term immigrants over short-term immigrants, with regard to
citizenship acquisition, one may also expect that the longer immigrants reside in a destination
country the higher the likelihood that they will acquire the citizenship of that country. Given
that for second generation often additional, facilitated ways exist to acquire citizenship, we
hypothesize that this residence effect holds in particular for first generation immigrants (H4).
H4: First generation immigrants who reside longer in a destination country are more
likely to have the citizenship of that country than those whose residence in the destination
country is shorter. (individual)
Given that the institutional context in all European countries favors descent-based
transmission of citizenship over other ways of acquiring citizenship, we also hypothesize that
immigrants of whom one parent is born in the country (and thus, presumably, is more likely to
be a citizen of that country) are also more likely to be a citizen of that country (H5).
5H5: Immigrants of whom one parent was born in the destination country are more likely
to have destination country citizenship than those of whom both parents were born abroad
(‘mixed parentage effect’). (individual)
The same can be said for immigrants who are married to a citizen of the destination country:
this often provides a ground for facilitated naturalisation. As our data only provides
information about marital status, but not about whether or not that is with a citizen of the
destination country, we hypothesize a general positive effect of marital status (H6). That is
also in line with earlier findings from Yang (1994: 470), who found that immigrants in the US
who were ever married were 18 percent more likely to become citizens than those who were
never married. Finally, Yang (1994: 472) also observes gender bias and finds that women are
more likely to naturalize. He argues that naturalization helps women to free themselves from
repressive marriages or occupations: citizenship provides autonomy (H7).
H6: Immigrants who are married are more likely to have destination country citizenship
than those who are not married. (individual)
H7: Male immigrants are less likely to have destination country citizenship than female
immigrants. (individual)
Socioeconomic perspective: push and pull factors
While formal-legal explanations undoubtedly have an intuitive plausibility, in the sense that
the legal framework ultimately determines whether an individual may have access to
citizenship, or not, there are good reasons to look beyond mere institutional conditions.
Acquiring destination country citizenship is a deliberate choice for first generation
immigrants and also for second generation immigrants often is not an automatic fact, certainly
not in Europe where most countries still do not have birthright citizenship for persons born at
the territory of a country (ius soli). Scholars have argued that the perceptions of immigrants of
the costs, benefits and meaning of naturalization are conditioned by the larger socioeconomic
environment around them (Yang, 1994: 456). These perceptions may be expected to be
influenced  both  by  the  socioeconomic  context  of  the  sending  country  as  well  of  that  of  the
destination country. From an economic perspective one may expect push and pull factors to
have a significant impact of the decision by immigrants to naturalize or not and these would
in general be summarized as follows: the less attractive it is to return to the country of origin
and the more attractive it is to stay in the country of destination, the more likely it is that an
immigrant will naturalize. In order to test this general push-pull hypothesis, we break it down
into four empirically measurable expectations.
With regard to push factors, we look at the economic and political situation in origin
countries. Following Jasso and Rosenzweig (1986, 303) we expect that immigrants from high-
GNP countries  of  origin  are  significantly  less  likely  to  naturalize  than  those  from countries
with a low GNP per capita (H8). The rationale behind this hypothesis is that citizenship
confers not only political rights, but mostly also a secure residence status and diplomatic
protection, and for immigrants from less developed countries the comparative benefits of
citizenship of a European state will be far greater than for those from more developed states.
We hypothesize along similar lines that immigrants from politically less stable countries are
more motivate to acquire the citizenship of their country of residence (H9).
6H8: Immigrants from less developed countries are more likely to have destination country
citizenship than immigrants from more developed countries. (origin country)
H9: Immigrants from politically unstable countries are more likely to have destination
country citizenship than immigrants from politically stable countries. (origin country)
With regard to pull factors, our argumentation follows partly follows the same line of
reasoning. With regard to GDP per capita, we hypothesize that immigrants are more likely to
aspire citizenship of a rich European country, than that of a less rich European country (H10).
H10: Immigrants are more likely to have destination country citizenship in countries with
a high GDP per capita. (destination country)
Given that all European countries included in our analysis are stable democracies, we do not
hypothesize that political stability makes a difference. Rather, with regard to pull factors, one
may expect –somewhat in contrast with the previous hypothesis–  that the attractiveness of the
citizenship of a destination country may be a function of net migration rates. The hypothesis
would be that the citizenship of a country with comparatively high immigration becomes
comparatively less attractive (H11). There are two arguments, one positive and one negative,
behind this hypothesis. The positive argument is that in a country with high immigration,
immigrants may already have sufficient networks in which they can function well without
having to integrate fully in the host society (Yang 1994: 456). The negative argument would
be that in a country with high immigration –certainly in the European context where
immigration is not as strongly embedded within the national self-perception as in the North
American context–  immigrants may experience antagonistic sentiments from the native
population, rather than encouragement to become a full member of the new host society.
H11: Immigrants are more likely to have destination country citizenship in countries with
a low net migration rate. (destination country)
Cultural perspective: attitudes towards citizenship
A third strand of explanations highlights the importance of culture, rather than economy (see
Bernard, 1936 for an early work). These explanations focus on the cultural similarity between
the destination country and country of origin, which in turn reduces the difficulty of
immigrants to integrate and ‘fosters their cultural adaptation to the host society’  (Yang 1994:
458). Colonial relations in particular may be expected to enhance such cultural similarity, in
terms of use of the same language, sharing a common history and, sometimes, similar
traditions. There is of course a wide variety of postcolonial constellations and in such cases as
India and the UK, or Cape Verde and Portugal, the expectation of cultural similarity may be
more realistic than in other cases of postcolonial relations. We also included countries, which
have belonged to the same political identity, like Austria, Hungary and the Czech republic, or
Norway and Sweden. Yet, overall we expect these historical ties to have a positive influence.
We thus hypothesize that being from a former colony will increase the likelihood of
citizenship acquisition in the destination country (H12).
H12: Immigrants from former colonies or former parts of the same political identity are
more likely to have destination country citizenship than immigrants from other countries.
(origin country)
7One variable that has been noticeably absent in the literature on the naturalization of
immigrants, as far as we can see, is religion. Yet at least within the specific context of
European host societies, the religious background of immigrants is nowadays a hot potato.
With regard to access to citizenship, in a country such as The Netherlands, citizenship tests
include questions about gay marriage, state-church relations etcetera that at least raise the
suggestion of being a litmus test for immigrants with a specific religious background.
‘Applicants for naturalisation even need to feel Dutch’  (Van Oers, 2009: 128). This arguably
may raise the bar for immigrants with a specific religious background and it is clear that in
these cases, such as the Netherland, when discussing religious background of immigrants
Islam is the main issue. We may thus expect this to have a negative effect on citizenship
acquisition rates (H13).
H13: Muslim immigrants are less likely to have destination country citizenship than non-
Muslim immigrants. (individual)
Furthermore, although one might perhaps expect that Muslim identity might lose force over
immigrant generations, and thus its potentially problematic effect on citizenship acquisition,
the theory of segmented assimilation expresses a more pessimistic view on the integration of,
particularly, the second generation (Portes and Zhou 1993; cf. Thomson and Crul 2007).
Faced with racial and ethnic discrimination and lower than expected employment success, one
might expect in particular the Muslim second generation to be less integrated, and thus also to
be less likely to have the citizenship of their country of residence (H14).
H14: Second generation Muslim immigrants are less likely to have destination country
citizenship than non-Muslim second generation immigrants. (individual)
Resource perspective: skills
Finally, individual characteristics, such as language competence, education and employment
can influence citizenship acquisition by shaping both the motivations for naturalization and by
affecting the ability to do so. With regard to language, Rosenzweig (1986: 305) observes that
for the US ‘coming from a country in which English is an official language facilitates
naturalization, for which knowledge of the English language is a requirement.’  Yang (1994:
468) confirms these findings. Furthermore, with regard to education, immigrants –like anyone
else–  have to invest in their education and those with higher education will thus have invested
more.  They  will  therefore  be  more  strongly  motivated  to  make  use  of  the  employment
opportunities they have based on their education and, with a view to returns from
employment, be more inclined to do so in the destination country than in the origin country.
Investing in education is also a sign that they are committed integrating in society. Finally,
successful economic adaptation to the host society, for example by way of employment,
increases immigrants’  commitment (Yang 1994: 455). We thus hypothesize that speaking the
language of the country of destination (H15), higher education (H16) and employment (H17)
all have a positive effect on citizenship acquisition.
H15: Immigrants who speak the language of their country of destination at home are
more likely to have the citizenship of that country. (individual)
H16: Higher educated immigrants are more likely to have the citizenship of their country
of residence than those with few years of education. (individual)
8H17: Employed immigrants are more likely to have the citizenship of their country of
residence than unemployed immigrants. (individual)
DATA AND MEASUREMENT
We use the second and third wave of the European Social Survey for our analysis.1 The data
are assembled in the years 2004-2005 for the second and 2006-2007 for the third wave
(Jowell and the Central Coordinating Team, 2005; Jowell and the Central Coordinating Team,
2007). From the 24 countries included in the European Social Survey we selected only those
15 countries which have been stable democracies and independent states for a few decennia:
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Finland, Spain, France, United Kingdom, Greece,
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Sweden (see Table 1).2 We do so
because we are interested in integration processes over a long period of time in a stable,
democratic setting. In order to enhance comparability with studies on immigration and
naturalization in the US and Canada, we aim to exclude as much as possible the influence of
changing borders and state formation (but see discussion below on definition of immigrant
status and effects of changing borders during the 20th century, even if one selects only the
stable democracies and independent states).
The pooled ESS dataset of the remaining 16 European countries contains 6.465 immigrants.
We  classify  respondents  as  immigrants  if  at  least  one  of  the  parents  of  the  respondent  was
born outside the survey country, or if they and at least one of the parents were born outside
the survey country. The respondents who were born outside the survey country but whose
parents were born in the survey country are classified as natives. We do not expect them to be
different from natives in the destination country. All other respondents are classified as
natives and are excluded from the analyses. If both parents were born in the same country,
this country is categorized as the country of origin. If the parents were born in different
countries we use the country that matches the language spoken at home. In all other cases the
country of birth of the mother is used (see Fleischmann & Dronkers, 2007 for a similar
approach). For first generation immigrants, i.e. those respondents who are themselves born
outside the survey country, their country of birth is used as country of origin.
The question of the definition of immigrant status is contested in the social sciences (see
Fleischmann & Dronkers, 2007, for an extensive discussion). A problem with the use of
country of birth or having immigrant parents for the measurement of immigrant status are the
changing national boundaries in Europe during the full 20th century and the start  of the 21st
century. Due to changes in political frontiers after 1918 (the restructuring of central and
eastern Europe, including Turkey) and 1945 (the annexation by Poland of some formerly
German territory) and due to the subsequent displacement of large populations, an unknown
number of ‘indigenous’  persons are measured as being born outside their country. For
example, think of German respondents or their parents who are born in Königsberg (East
Prussia, now Russia) and now living in Germany, One can argue that by failing to make the
distinction between genuine migrants and border changes, we overestimate the number of
better-integrated immigrants. At the same time, this potential defect highlights a conceptual
problem in defining an immigrant: for how many generations must an East Prussian family
live in Germany before he/she is no longer considered outlandish (see Kossert, 2008)? This
1 The  first  wave  of  the  European  Social  Survey  is  not  usable  for  our  purposes,  because  it  does  not  include
information on the countries of origin of second generation immigrants.
2 We exclude Italy because it is not included in the second and third wave of the ESS.
9issue also extends to the large number of ‘visible minority’  natives, whose grandparents
migrated from former colonies to Europe. The grandchildren of these immigrants are not
included in this analysis, because their parents are born in the European country of destination
where the respondent is also born.
Another problem of using the ESS for comparative analyses of immigrants is the selectivity of
the migrants in the ESS sample. As the ESS is not specifically designed to include
immigrants, and because participation requires language proficiency, the immigrants that are
in  the  sample  need  to  speak  the  language  of  the  destination  country3 and be willing to
participate in a survey, so they most probably have a legal status in the country of destination.
This selectivity of established immigrants in the ESS might be undesirable, but at this
moment the ESS data are the best available for a comparative European analysis with
comparable and relevant dependent and independent variables. We should keep in mind,
however, that if significant and substantial effects are found for these legal, more well-
established immigrants, the effects are probably even larger with the illegal immigrants that
are not included in the survey.
The dependent variable of our analysis is destination country citizenship. Respondents of the
European Social Survey are asked whether they have the citizenship of the country where the
survey is carried out. Unfortunately they are not asked in which year they have acquired that
citizenship (e.g. after how many years of residence) and they are also not asked how they
have acquired it (e.g. whether automatically by birth or by naturalization). Those data would
allow us to measure the effects of changing citizenship policies in destination countries.
Respondents  are  also  not  asked  whether  they  have  another  citizenship  (e.g.  of  their  or  their
parents’  country of origin). Hence we do not know the percentage of immigrants with two or
more citizenships in destination countries. Table 1 provides the percentages of first and
second generation immigrants per destination country that are a citizen of that country. The
second column provides the total number of first and second generation immigrants surveyed
in each country of destination.
[Table 1 around here]
Table 2 shows descriptive information about the independent variables, which we use in this
analysis.4 All the included individual variables and their coding are self-evident and directly
derived from the European Social Survey. However, the educational level of the immigrants
was originally measured on the seven point scale of ISCED-97, but unfortunately the
measurement of education in the United Kingdom forces us to reduce this to a four
dichotomous variables, by collapsing the categories of less than primary and primary
education to one dummy, by joining the upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary to
one dummy and by joining first stage of tertiary education and second stage of tertiary
education to the variable tertiary education. The fourth dummy is lower secondary education.5
3 The survey was only conducted in the official languages of the countries of destination.
4 Instead of using the complete-case analysis in which respondents with any missing values are completely
removed from the analysis (Jones, 1999), we decided to rely on the missing dummy variable method as proposed
by  Cohen  and  Cohen  (1983).  If  for  a  respondent  one  of  the  individual  characteristics  was  not  available,  we
imputed the mean of the people from the same immigrant status, country of origin, educational level and
immigrant generation. For educational level the country of origin mean is used. If there was no available
reference category, the mean of the immigrants in the country of destination was imputed. For all imputations a
missing  dummy was  created  who was  also  used  in  the  analyses  of  perceived discrimination.  If  this  dummy is
significant, this means the imputation should better not have occurred. Because of the average small number of
imputations we do not think this to be a problem.
5 We have used the same procedure as Fleischmann & Dronkers, 2007.
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With regard to the religious background of respondents we used dummies that indicate the
religious group the respondent says he or she belongs to. In this analysis we only use the
dummy variable adherent to Muslim religion. We also use the number of years since the first
generation immigrant has arrived in the destination country. We collapsed the categories
recently and less than 6 years into one. The other categories are given by the ESS
questionnaire. Finally we use one indicator for whether the respondent is currently living
together with a partner (either married or cohabiting).
[Table 2 around here]
With regard to the macro-characteristics of destination countries we have collected the policy
indicators of the level of legal openness of these societies (ius soli; MIPEX), and socio-
economic characteristics of the country of destination (GDP, openness of the labourmarket;
net migration rate). All countries which have a form of ius soli (citizenship is given to
everybody born in that country) for second as for the third generation (the so-called double
ius soli) are coded 1, the other countries are coded zero. This is problematic because some
countries like Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain have a very easy access for second
generation immigrants, formally not equal to a ius soli, but in practice not far from that.
Therefore we coded these countries as ius soli. We did not code Luxembourg and Germany as
ius soli countries, because they introduced that option too recently to affect our respondents.
The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) is a measurement of the different policies
towards the integration of migrants for 28 states among which 25 EU-member states. It uses
over a hundred policy indicators in six areas of shaping citizenship for immigrants (Niessen,
Huddleston and Citron, 2007). Higher scores represent better migrant integration policies on a
scale from 0 to 100. We use only the subscale for ‘access to nationality’.
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is an indicator of the economic wealth of the
destination country (Data are from 2005; OECD, 2007). The net-migration rate of a
destination country is the difference between the immigration and emigration in a country per
1000 persons in the population per year. The mean net migration rate of 2007 is used (CIA
World Fact Book, 2007).
With regard to the macro-characteristics of origin countries the first indicator is an economic
characteristic, which might indicate the importance of the economic motives for immigration.
The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite measure for the development level of a
country. Its three components are a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of
living. Data of the Human Development report 2007/2008 are used. We recode this index in
such a way that a high score means a higher developmental level. The second indicator is a
political characteristic, which might indicate the importance of political motives for
immigration. We use Kaufmann’s indicator of political stability, which assesses the
probability that the government in function will be overthrown in the near future by
unconstitutional or violent means (Kaufmann et al., 2006). Data from 2006 are used. Using
seven to eleven components, the indicator ranges from -2.5 to + 2.5 due to a standardization
procedure. Higher scores indicate more political stability. The third indicator is a historical
characteristic, which might indicate a more easy access to the citizenship of the country of
destination.  If  the  country  of  origin  was  a  former  colony  or  territory  of  the  country  of
destination, this might promote citizenship in the latter.6
6 These are, in the first place, countries that have been or still  are colonies (for instance India for the UK, the
Spanish-speaking countries of Latin America for Spain, and Brazil for Portugal). But in the case of Austria,
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For the variable ‘dual citizenship’  we use data on whether the citizenship of countries of
origin is lost automatically upon voluntary acquisition of another citizenship. We use an
extensive and yearly updated list used by the Dutch Ministry of Justice of provisions in all
UN member states. We use the list from October 2001 as reference date (Ministerie van
Justitie 2001). This is a somewhat arbitrary choice, given that these provisions sometimes
change over time. However, given that the ESS data do not provide the year of acquisition of
destination country citizenship, we chose to use a reference date at least a few years before the
data collection of the second ESS wave. Before 2001 it is more difficult to obtain extensive
and reliable data. Where citizenship is lost automatically we code this as 0 and where
citizenship is not lost automatically, but can be renounced after acquiring another citizenship,
or where it cannot be lost at all, we code this as 1.
Finally, our method of analysis needs to take into account the nested structure of our data as
respondents are nested in communities and communities are nested in countries of destination
as well as countries of origin. For this reason we use multilevel analysis. As the two levels of
country of origin and country of destination are not hierarchically nested, we use a cross-
classified model that makes it possible for respondents to be nested both in countries of origin
as well as in countries of destination (Van Tubergen, Maas & Flap, 2004). Given the
dichotomous nature of our dependent variables (respondents either do or do not have
destination country citizenship) we apply logistic multilevel analysis.
RESULTS
Our first model is a so-called empty model, in which we do not explain any of the variance in
citizenship of immigrants yet (Table 4). We can see that the majority of the non-individual
level variance is at the level of destination country and not at the origin country. This means
that there are more differences in citizenship acquisition by immigrants between destination
countries than between origin countries. However, this is partly spurious. As soon as we
control for the individual characteristics in model 2, there is also substantial variation at the
origin level. This means that the individual characteristics of the immigrants are related with
their country of origin in such a way that they ‘neutralize’  variation between the countries of
origin. An explanation might be that the characteristics of the immigrants from less developed
origin countries are more positive (for instance are younger and arrived more recently) than
the  characteristics  of  immigrants  from  more  developed  origin  countries  (who  are  older  and
live already longer in the destination countries). In this example the negative effect of the
individual characteristics (age; year in destination) neutralizes the positive effect of the
macro-characteristic Development index.
[Table 3 around here]
Our second step first step is to build a model by adding all macro characteristics of the origin
and the destination country to the empty model. We include the macro-characteristics one by
one and single, and so the first column of Table 3 shows the significant and non-significant
parameters of these macro-features and between parentheses how much the fit of the model
improves.7 The results show that these macro-characteristics seem to be significantly related
Germany, the UK and Sweden they also included those countries that were a part of their former territories (for
example Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the former Yugoslavia for Austria; Norway for Sweden).
7 A negative number indicates an improvement of the model by the inclusion of the characteristic.
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with the likelihood of obtaining the citizenship of the country of destination. One has to
remember that the significance of these coefficients might be spurious, because these results
do not take into account the individual characteristics of the immigrants.
The  third  column  of  Table  3  shows  the  coefficients  of  these  single  features,  but  now
controlled for individual characteristics of the immigrants. This control for individual
characteristics hardly changes the significance of the macro-features: all remain significant
after inclusion of the effect of individual characteristics. However, one has to keep in mind
that these results might be spurious because these macro-characteristics are strongly
correlated (see Tables A4a and A4b of the Appendix)
[Table 4 around here]
Model 2 of Table 4 shows the coefficients of the individual characteristics. Given the strong
decrease of the loglikelihood individual characteristics are far more important for the
explanation of citizenship of immigrants than the macro-features. Speaking a minority
language at home decreases the likelihood of citizenship of destination, while being a first
generation immigrant who stays already longer than 20 years or a second generation
immigrant, the offspring of a marriage between an immigrant and a native, and an older
second generation immigrant increases the likelihood of citizenship of destination
significantly. Socio-economic position, educational level and individual religion do not
influence this likelihood significantly. The hypothesized interactions between some individual
characteristics are not significant.
We  add  in  model  3  the  significant  macro-characteristics  of  origin  country  all  together.  The
effects of all macro-characteristics of the origins countries remain significant, while dual
citizenship remains insignificant.8 Each of these characteristics has its own effect, which
cannot be explained by its relation with the other macro-features. The predicting force of
these characteristics of the origin countries is quite powerful because they explain about half
of the variance and as a consequence strongly improve the fit of our model, indicated by a
strong decrease of the loglikelihood.
We add in model 4 the significant characteristics of country of destination. The interaction
between second-generation and ius soli is no longer significant and the same holds for GDP
per capita. Net migration rate and access to nationality remain significant and thus have their
own effect, which cannot be explained by its relation with the other macro-features. Ius soli
and GDP per capita have no such independent effect. The predicting force of these
characteristics of the destination countries is quite poor because they explain hardly any
variance and as a consequence improves hardly the fit of our model, indicated by a small
decrease of the loglikelihood.
Model 5 contains all individual characteristics and the significant macro features of both
origin and destination together. All the three macro-features of the origin countries and the
two macro-variables of the destination remain significant. The direction of the parameters of
the macro-variables hardly changed compared with those of models 3 and 4, which shows that
the strong correlations between the macro-features do not bias our results.
8 Yang (1994: 458) also expects a positive effect of dual citizenship policies in countries of origin, but his
analysis shows a negative relation (pp. 473-474). This contrast seems to be explained by the fact that Yang
coded the dummy variable dual citizenship based on data from the second half of the 1950s when the number of
countries accepting dual citizenship was much lower in the early 1990s than it is today. In his analysis almost all
countries were coded as being intolerant on dual citizenship (see also his Table 1).
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[Table 5 around here]
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Does  citizenship  policy  matter?  The  results  of  our  analysis  show  that  it  does.  Immigrants
indeed are more likely to have the citizenship of a destination country with a citizenship law
that makes citizenship relatively accessible, in comparison with other countries. The
importance of citizenship policy should however be qualified. Firs, with regard to citizenship
laws in origin countries, where we hypothesized an effect of dual citizenship policies, we
found no significant effect. Second, more importantly, with regard to the relative explanatory
power of the different variables that we tested, it is clear that legal-formal explanations that
focus on institutional conditions provide the weakest explanation. The same goes for net
migration rates in destination countries, which have a significant, but empirically weak
negative effect on citizenship acquisition rates.
Of greater empirical importance are three variables related to the cultural and socioeconomic
conditions  in  the  countries  of  origin.  Immigrants  from  former  colonies  or  from  poor  or
political instable countries are more likely to become a citizen of their country of residence.
These findings indicate that it matters much more where an immigrant comes from, than
where her or she is going.
Yet the largest variation in terms of whether first and second generation immigrants have the
citizenship of their country of residence is explained by individual factors. From a democratic
perspective that finding may be seen as encouraging in the sense that it matters less where you
come  from,  or  where  you  are,  but  rather  who  and  what  you  are.  We  find  that  second
generation and first generation immigrants who arrived more than 20 years ago, immigrants
with one parent born in the destination country, retired workers and persons speaking the host
country language at home, are more likely to be a citizen of their country of residence. We
find no significant effects for education and employment. With regard to cultural factors,
although we find no significant effect of adherence to Islam for the first generation, but we do
find that in particular for second generation immigrants Muslims are less likely to have host
country citizenship than comparable non-Muslims immigrants. The latter, somewhat
pessimistic finding offers support for what in the literature is called the phenomenon of
segmented assimilation and which draws attention to the social stratification factors that
makes some immigrant groups susceptible to downward mobility (Portes and Zhou 1993;
Zhou 1997).
We end with a few important caveats.
First, with regard to the scope of this analysis, it needs to be stressed that we only look at
immigrant citizenship status in European destination countries. This can be seen both as a
plus and as a minus of our analysis. On the plus side, whereas by far most empirical work in
this area has been done on immigrant status in traditional immigrant societies, in particular
the US, in this paper we take a large set of hypotheses from the existing literature and test
those in the European setting. This allows us to compare similarities and differences in terms
of immigrant citizenship acquisition between these different contexts. Yet it also means, on
the down side, that our findings are specific for exactly that European context.
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Second, with regard to the data that we use, whereas most existing work so far has been done
based on census data, again particularly in the North American context (but see also
Steinhardt 2008 on the German context and Evans 1988 on Australia), we use survey data in
this paper (compare also Bevelander and Veenman 2006 for an analysis of survey data from
the Netherlands). One clear downside of our survey approach is that we cannot do a cohort
approach, which would be possible had we used census data. Our data do not indicate, for
example, the year of arrival in destination countries of first generation immigrants. In more
general terms our analysis provides a weak measurement of the time-dimension of
immigration. Our dataset takes stock of the existing population in the recent years and thus
covers all kind of immigrants, and their offspring, who have migrated into European countries
over the full 20th century. In some cases, the term ‘migrant’  would not even apply because
people  in  fact  did  not  cross  borders,  but  rather  the  other  way  around:  as  a  result  of  state-
formation and boundary redrawing people suddenly find themselves being part of a different
country and migrate (for instance from East Prussia to Germany), although their nationality
remained the same. Those kinds of people, although a minority, are also part of our immigrant
population, because they had to settle again in a new and sometimes hostile environment (see
Kossert,  2008).  At the same time, this may be seen as a strength of our analysis,  given that
whereas much existing research on immigrant integration in European countries tends to
focus on problematic immigrants groups (see e.g. Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010 on Turks in
France, Germany and the Netherlands) our analysis provides a much more comprehensive
picture of the whole range of immigration.
Third, with regard to the causal direction assumed in the equations of our regression model,
we realize that we should be careful not to exclude the possibility that in some cases the
causal direction may be reverse. After all, some individual characteristics might be the
consequences of certain immigrant policies (high educated immigrants might be the
consequence of an immigration policy which allows only high educated immigrants to enter
legally a destination country). If one controls in such a case the effect of this policy-indicator
for  individual  characteristics  (as  we  do  in  this  analysis),  one  assumes  the  wrong  causal
direction.  This  can  lead  to  flawed parameters  for  that  policy-indicator,  and  mostly  its  effect
will be underestimated. However, table 3 does not suggest that the parameters of
characteristics of the destination countries are flawed, because they hardly changed after
controlling for the individual characteristics.
Thus more empirical work needs to be done, but our analysis already clearly reveals that the
acquisition of citizenship by immigrants in Europe is not primarily driven by legal
characteristics, but in the first place by social, economic and historical features of individuals
and countries.
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Table 1: Percentages immigrants with destination country citizenship
(Number of immigrants per destination country included in pooled ESS dataset)
Country
% N
France 82,9 691
Sweden 82,4 704
Netherlands 82,1 274
United Kingdom 79,6 603
Austria 79,5 351
Denmark 77,9 299
Germany 74 758
Belgium 71,7 590
Ireland 68,4 152
Norway 64,7 312
Greece 64,6 367
Finland 58,6 58
Portugal 51,5 231
Spain 37,2 301
Luxembourg 36,5 784
Total / Average 68,7 6475
Source: unweighted data of the second and third wave of the European Social Survey
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Minimum Maximum Mean Std.
Deviation
Individual characteristics of respondent
Citizen destination country 0.00 1.00 0.69 0.46
Minority language 0.00 1.00 0.22 0.41
Parents with mixed marriage 0.00 1.00 0.37 0.48
Second generation 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.50
Arrived 0-5 years ago in destination country 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.30
Arrived 6-10 years ago in destination country 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.27
Arrived 10-20 years ago in destination country 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.34
Arrived > 20 years ago in destination country 0.00 1.00 0.21 0.41
Age respondent/10 1.30 9.70 4.29 1.74
Female 0.00 1.00 0.52 0.50
Married or cohabitating 0.00 1.00 0.59 0.49
Only primary education 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.38
Lower secondary education 0.00 1.00 0.22 0.42
Higher secondary education 0.00 1.00 0.34 0.47
Tertiary education 0.00 1.00 0.26 0.44
Unemployed 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.26
Retired 0.00 1.00 0.15 0.36
Housework 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.30
Student 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.31
Occupational status 0.00 1.00 0.24 0.43
Islam 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.31
Origin macro-characteristics
Origin former colony or territory 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.43
Human Development Index origin 0.47 0.97 0.84 0.13
Kaufmann index political stability origin -2.91 1.92 0.18 0.82
Dual citizenship 0.00 1.00 0.54 0.50
Destination macro-characteristics
Net migration rate 0.28 8.64 2.64 2.39
GDP per capita/1000 21.80 80.80 41.60 15.59
Ius soli 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.50
MIPEX Access to nationality destination 22 71 50.01 15.51
Source: unweighted data of the second and third wave of the European Social Survey
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Table 3: The parameters of single macro-characteristics as determinants of destination country
citizenship, without (model 1) and with control (model 2) for individual characteristics of
immigrants (change in -2loglikelihood)
Without control for
individual characteristics
(model 1)
With  control  for
individual characteristics
(model 2)
Coefficient Change
loglikelihood
Coefficient Change
loglikelihood
Origin macro-characteristics
Origin former colony or territory 0.60** -55 0.46** -242
Human Development Index -0.30 -8 -0.17 +10
Kaufmann index political stability  0.12* -21 0.49** -414
Dual citizenship -0.14 +2 0.23 +70
Destination macro-characteristics
Net migration rate -0.17** -82 -0.18** -297
GDP per capita -0.02** -44 -0.02** (-422)
Second generation 2.28** -0.07
Ius soli -0.05 0.09
Ius soli * second generation 0.70**
-3191
0.54**
+70
MIPEX Access to nationality 0.01** +21 0.02** +79
Source: unweighted data of the second and third wave of the European Social Survey
* Significant at 0.05 level. ** Significant at 0.01 level.
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Table 4: Logistic multilevel analyses of determinants of destination country citizenship: unstandardized
coefficients (and standard errors).
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Individual characteristics
Minority language -0.43**
(0.09)
-0.47**
(0.09)
-0.46**
(0.10)
-0.49** (0.10)
Mixed parentage
(one parent born in destination country)
1.89**
(0.15)
1.98**
(0.15)
1.91**
(0.15)
1.98** (0.15)
Age/10 0.02 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04)
Age /10* second generation 0.32**
(0.07)
0.31**
(0.07)
0.29**
(0.07)
0.28** (0.07)
Second generation 0.06 (0.31) 0.16 (0.31) 0.15 (0.32) 0.34 (0.31)
Arrived 0-5 years ago in destination
country
-2.35**
(0.15)
-2.55**
(0.16)
-2.46**
(0.16)
-2.63** (0.16)
Arrived 6-10 years ago in destination
country
-1.35**
(0.14)
-1.53**
(0.14)
-1.48**
(0.15)
-1.61** (0.15)
Arrived 10-20 years ago in destination
country
-0.57**
(0.12)
-0.63**
(0.12)
-0.64**
(0.12)
-0.67** (0.12)
Arrived > 20 years ago (ref.)
Gender (female) 0.03 (0.12) 0.04 (0.12) 0.02 (0.12) 0.03 (0.12)
Marital status: married or cohabitating -0.11 (0.12) -0.13 (0.12) -0.13 (0.12) -0.15 (0.12)
Female*Marital status 0.04 (0.15) 0.08 (0.16) 0.06 (0.16) 0.09 (0.16)
Only primary education -0.07 (0.13) -0.12 (0.13) -0.09 (0.13) -0.13 (0.13)
Lower secondary education -0.09 (0.12) -0.13 (0.12) -0.09 (0.12) -0.12 (0.12)
Higher secondary education 0.02 (0.10) 0.02 (0.10) 0.07 (0.10) 0.07 (0.10)
Tertiary education (ref.)
No work (ref.)
Unemployed 0.08 (0.11) 0.07 (0.15) 0.12 (0.15) 0.10 (0.15)
Retired 0.32*
(0.16)
0.37**
(0.16)
0.39**
(0.16)
0.42** (0.16)
Housework 0.05 (0.13) 0.03 (0.13) 0.11 (0.13) 0.09 (0.14)
Student 0.25 (0.14) 0.29 (0.15) 0.30 (0.15) 0.33 (0.15)
Occupational status 0.12 (0.09) 0.12 (0.09) 0.12 (0.09) 0.13 (0.09)
Islam 0.24 (0.15) 0.25 (0.16) 0.25 (0.16) 0.26 (0.16)
Islam * Second generation -0.30 (0.28) -0.53* (0.29) -0.46 (0.29) -0.68** (0.30)
Origin macro-characteristics
Former colony or territory 0.49**
(0.17)
0.37** (0.17)
Human Development Index origin -0.57* (0.28) -0.61** (0.29)
Kaufmann index political stability origin 0.52**
(0.09)
0.53** (0.09)
Dual citizenship 0.19 (0.17)
Destination macro-characteristics
Net migration rate -0.17**
(0.06)
-0.15** (0.03)
GDP per capita/1000 0.00 (0.01)
MIPEX Access to nationality *10 0.12**
(0.01)
0.12** (0.04)
Ius soli -0.15 (0.18)
Ius soli * Second generation 0.28 (0.22)
Constant 0.67**
(0.06)
0.76**
(0.12)
0.57**
(0.27)
0.51
(0.42)
0.47 (0.36)
Destination variance 0.86**
(0.11)
0.76**
(0.13)
0.77**
(0.13)
0.73**
(0.13)
0.72** (0.13)
Origin variance 0.02
(0.05)
0.40**
(0.13)
0.23**
(0.10)
0.43**
(0.13)
0.25** (0.10)
-2loglikelihood 7295 1381 632 1317 530
Nimmigrants=6475; Norigin = 156; Ndestination= 15;
Source: unweighted data of the second and third wave of the European Social Survey
* Significant at 0.05 level ** Significant at 0.01 level.
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Table 5. Summary of hypotheses and outcome of analysis
Destination country
H1: Immigrants are more likely to have destination country citizenship in countries with a
citizenship law that makes citizenship relatively easily accessible. ACCEPTED
H2: Second generation immigrants are more likely to have destination country citizenship in
countries where birth in a country provides automatic or highly facilitated access to
citizenship (‘ius soli effect’). REJECTED
H10: Immigrants are more likely to have destination country citizenship in countries with a
high GDP per capita. REJECTED
H11: Immigrants are more likely to have destination country citizenship in countries with a
low net migration rate. ACCEPTED
Origin country
H3: Immigrants from countries that accept dual citizenship are more likely to have destination
country citizenship than immigrants from those countries that do not accept dual citizenship.
REJECTED
H8: Immigrants from less developed countries are more likely to have destination country
citizenship than immigrants from more developed countries. ACCEPTED
H9: Immigrants from politically unstable countries are more likely to have destination country
citizenship than immigrants from politically stable countries. ACCEPTED
H12: Immigrants from former colonies are more likely to have destination country citizenship
than immigrants from other countries. ACCEPTED
Individual
H4: First generation immigrants who reside longer in a destination country are more likely to
have the citizenship of that country than those whose residence in the destination country is
shorter. ACCEPTED
H5: Immigrants of whom one parent was born in the destination country are more likely to
have destination country citizenship than those of whom both parents were born abroad
(‘mixed parentage effect’). ACCEPTED
H6: Immigrants who are married are more likely to have destination country citizenship than
those who are not married. REJECTED
H7: Male immigrants are less likely to have destination country citizenship than female
immigrants. REJECTED
H13: Muslim immigrants are less likely to have destination country citizenship than non-
Muslim immigrants. REJECTED
H14: Second generation Muslim immigrants are less likely to have destination country
citizenship than non-Muslim second generation immigrants. ACCEPTED
H15:  Immigrants  who  speak  the  language  of  their  country  of  destination  at  home  are  more
likely to have the citizenship of that country. ACCEPTED
H16: Higher educated immigrants are more likely to have the citizenship of their country of
residence than those with few years of education. REJECTED
H17: Employed immigrants are more likely to have the citizenship of their country of
residence than unemployed immigrants. REJECTED
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Appendix
Table A1: the number of cases of immigrants from various origin and destination countries
AUT BEL GER DEN SPA FIN FRA UK GRE IRE LUX NET NOR POR SWE
Algeria 7 6 109 1 1 1 1
Angola 1 1 64
Argentina 18 1
Australia 1 1 1 12 1 3 1
Austria 2 38 3 2 4 3 2 7
Belgium 1 2 1 1 23 7 1 77 17 2
Bosnia  &
Herzegovina
22 1 6 6 4 7 4 9 16
Bulgaria 2 1 2 2 1 17 1 2
Brazil 1 1 2 5 1 3 1 2 44 1
Congo 24 3 6 1 1 2 1
Croatia 17 5 3 2 2 1 1 7
Cyprus 4 7 1
Czech Republic 34 2 46 2 1 1 1 2 2
Czechoslovakia 12 1 1 3
Denmark 2 1 2 1 1 3 41 29
Egypt 2 1 2 3 2 9 1 1 1
Estonia 2 1 1 1
Finland 9 1 1 2 12 211
France 4 115 13 3 13 6 2 1 117 2 6 6 4
Germany 71. 23 2 64 2 25 31 2 6 102 57 18 68
Greece 2 9 9 4 1 1 1 2 3
Hungary 28 7 17 2 1 2 3 1 4
India 2 2 3 1 1 68 2 2 1 2 7 4
Indonesia 1 3 43
Iran 1 1 7 5 1 2 1 1 5 22
Iraq 2 2 2 11 1 2 1 3 11 22
Ireland 1 1 2 2 119 2 1 2 1
Italy 29 96 37 4 5 111 10 1 94 8 1 3
Jamaica 1 35
Lithuania 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
Morocco 68 8 2 38 65 1 1 9 1
Netherlands 4 76 8 2 2 2 5 2 33 7 6
Norway 2 23 2 52
Pakistan 4 2 4 3 47 3 6
Philippines 2 3 5 3 7 1 2 5 3 7 1
Poland 11 9 140 12 2 31 19 4 1 9 6 12 1 32
Portugal 1 5 1 19 51 4 221 1 2
Romania 17 3 26 22 3 1 4 2 3 5 2
Former USSR * 1 5 137 4 8 29 8 2 51 2 5 5 8 5
Serbia  &
Montenegro
14 4 2 4 1 7
Slovakia 5 4 1 3 1
Spain 2 16 7 62 10 3 8 3 1 8 1
Sri Lanka 1 5 1 15 2 1 3
Sweden 2 2 23 15 2 1 43
Switzerland 8 6 3 11 6 4 1 3 6
Tunisia 6 2 37 2 1 1
Turkey 29 25 108 12 6 148 1 17 7 18
Ukraine 2 1 20 6 1 3 3 3 2 14
United Kingdom 51 11. 8 9 4 8 6 110 5 5 28 1 20
United States 1 4 15 12 2 3 6 27 3 7 4 2 30 9
Former Yugoslavia 7 2 9 4 1 29 1 22
Spanish Speaking
Caribbean & South
America
1 1 21 2 2 3 1 1 4 28
Remaining
Northern Europe
12 1 2 3
Remaining
Western Asia
1 2 5 3 1 3 6 1 1 20
Eastern Africa 5 1 4 8 23 1 4 8 11
Remaining South-
East Asia
1 2 5 7 2 1 3
Western Africa 8 3 6 29 7 1 1 11 1 1 47 2
Remaining
Southern Europe
8 1 1 8 1 1 1
Remaining 2 1 3 1 5 1 1
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Southern Asia
Dutch Speaking
Caribbean
1 14
Eastern Asia 3 1 2 2 1 7 1 6 1 1 13
Middle Africa 7 1 6 3 6
Remaining Eastern
Europe
2 4 2 4 6 2 83 2 2 14
English Speaking
Caribbean & South
America
1 7
Remaining
Northern Africa
1 2 2 1 1 1
Remaining
Northern America
10 2
Australia and New
Zealand
7 1 2
Southern Africa 2 3 18
French Speaking
Caribbean
1 11
Remaining
Western Europe
1 4 3 4
Source: unweighted data of the second and third wave of the European Social Survey; *Former USSR Excluding Belarus, Ukraine and the
Baltic states. We merge only in these appendix tables those countries into regions which had less than 10 cases. The nineteen regions of
origin we use are derived from the United Nations classification of geographical regions (United Nations Statistical Office).
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Table A2: total number of immigrants per country or region of origin and percentage of those
immigrants who have the nationality of the country of destination.
Origin countries Number of
immigrants
% citizenship in destination
country
Angola 68 64,7%
Austria 62 77,4%
Bosnia Herzegovina 71 57,7%
Belgium 132 60,6%
Bulgaria 28 39,3%
Brazil 61 34,4%
Congo 38 78,9%
Switzerland 48 66,7%
Serbia Montenegro 36 69,4%
Cyprus 12 83,3%
Czech Republic 91 93,4%
Germany 471 80,3%
Denmark 83 73,5%
Algeria 126 81,7%
Egypt 22 81,8%
Spain 138 80,4%
Finland 236 81,4%
France 292 65,1%
UK 221 67,0%
Greece 33 54,5%
Croatia 38 78,9%
Hungary 65 92,3%
Indonesia 47 100,0%
Ireland 127 85,8%
India 95 78,9%
Iraq 57 56,1%
Iran 46 69,6%
Italy 401 64,8%
Jamaica 36 91,7%
Sri Lanka 28 89,3%
Lithuania 11 81,8%
Morocco 193 67,4%
Netherlands 148 58,8%
Norway 79 75,9%
Philippines 39 69,2%
Pakistan 69 78,3%
Poland 289 82,4%
Portugal 305 22,6%
Rumania 88 52,3%
Former USSR 270 78,5%
Sweden 88 78,4%
Slovakia 14 78,6%
Tunisia 49 87,8%
Turkey 371 71,4%
Ukraine 55 40,0%
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USA 125 68,8%
Czechoslovakia 17 94,1%
Former Yugoslavia 75 53,3%
Spanish Caribbean 171 51,5%
North Europe 18 66,7%
West Asia 80 78,8%
East Africa 78 76,9%
Southeast Asia 21 76,2%
West Africa 145 54,5%
South Europe 21 81,0%
South Asia 14 35,7%
Dutch Caribbean & South America 35 100,0%
East Asia 90 71,1%
Middle Africa 23 60,9%
East Europe 148 36,1%
English Caribbean 8 100,0%
North Africa 8 62,5%
North America 30 83,3%
Australia, New Zealand & Pacific 29 55,2%
Southern Africa 42 88,1%
French Caribbean & South America  12 91,7%
West Europe 8 62,5%
Total 6475 68,7%
Source: unweighted data of the second and third wave of the European Social Survey. We merge only in these appendix tables those
countries into regions which had less than 10 cases.The nineteen regions of origin we use are derived from the United Nations classification
of geographical regions (United Nations Statistical Office).
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Table A3: Percentage immigrants with citizenship of destination-country for the largest
immigrants groups and the destination countries with the largest number of immigrants
Country of destination
Country of origin Belgium Germany France United
Kingdom
Luxembourg Sweden
Algeria 57 88 0
Belgium 0 96 86 47
Finland 0 0 84
France 75 92 83 50 50
Germany 87 92 84 69 94
Ireland 0 88 0 0
Italy 54 41 95 90 47 33
Morocco 79 63 71 0 100
Netherlands 66 63 50 60 55 50
Poland 67 94 97 58 44 78
Portugal 0 40 61 50 8 100
Spain 81 86 90 60 63 71
Former USSR * 100 91 100 50 0 100
Turkey 80 38 67 0 72
United Kingdom 64 50 75 0 65
United States 75 80 67 37 50 89
Spanish Speaking
Caribbean & South
America
100 0 83 100 33 86
Western Africa 63 0 63 67 36 100
Remaining Eastern
Europe
60 70 86 100 0 92
Source: unweighted data of the second and third wave of the European Social Survey; empty cells have no observation. We merge only in
these appendix tables those countries into regions which had less than 10 cases.The nineteen regions of origin we use are derived from the
United Nations classification of geographical regions (United Nations Statistical Office).
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Table A4a: correlations between macro-characteristics (origin country)
Former colony HDI Kaufmann political
stability
Former colony 1
HDI 0.18 1
Kaufmann political stability 0.00 0.54 1
Dual citizenship -0.05 -0.13 -0.04
Table A4b: correlations between macro-characteristics (destination country)
Net migration rate Access to
nationality
Ius soli
Net migration rate 1
Access to nationality -0.03 1
Ius soli -0.04 0.61 1
gdp 0.72 -0.13 -0.33
